I suggest moving back in time a bit to the pre-socratic philosophers. Let's take Heraclitus. Although we only have fragments of his writing, he seems to be saying (unlike his predecessors) that the universe is a sort of "unity of opposites". He gives us examples of the lyre, harp, and bow. He says that there are clearly opposite forces in these objects that, in pulling away from each other, create dynamic unities—unities through "strife". So, we can tentatively interpret Heraclitus' proposition (and please feel free to correct me if you think this is wrong, provided you've read him somewhat) to mean that if there is any perspective (e.g., being compared to Socrates) from which it is true to say of an object, x (say, Simmias), that it has property p (e.g., tallness), then there exists at least one other perspective, as legitimate as the first (e.g., being compared to Phaedo), from which it is true to say of x that it has property opposite-p (in the present case, shorness). Does Heraclitus' thesis seem to be a necessary truth about (physical) objects and their properties? Why or why not?

I suggest we move the topic on. Philosophy, anyone?

I did three all-nighters in a row the week before finals last semester, which would mean over 72 hours straight. I got so sick after that I had a siezure and almost went into a coma. College sucks, but is still somehow addictive.

No one is born intelligent, or talented, or with any other pre-formed skill or intellect. There is no way to gain knowledge without being taught. Aristotle talks about habit and nature in his Nicomachean Ethics (I'm sorry to bring this selection in, but I believe it gives the best argument). By nature, we are born with certain things, i.e. lungs, heart, legs, etc. Those are necessary. Habit, however, is how we form our ideas and philosophy. Habit is formed by being taught something, accepting it, and practicing it. This is not to say that some are not born with certain dispositions; but a disposition towards a thing is different than the thing itself. Ask Michael Jordan why he's so good at basketball. He won't tell you he was born with the skill or knowledge of the game. No, it was work. Hard work. Habit. In the same way, intelligence cannot be acquired in any other way than by teaching and habit.

Justice is perfect. How, then, if it is used by an imperfect being? Does this imperfection negate it completely? For if it did, justice would not exist. But we know justice exists, and it must conform to the non-contradiction premise, so a flawed use of justice must exist. How should we then approach justice, being imperfect? For if justice cannot be nullified by a flawed use of it, how can if function? Let us examine a flawed use of it. Those who are imperfect, by nature seek their own good. Thus, they would be prone to use justice in a way that benefits themselves, and thus use justice as an injustice. If one, however, was in pursuit of justice in its perfection, he would have a good motive, and use justice--albeit in a flawed way--in a manner that best mirrors justice. It is, then, better to use an imperfect justice than none at all, provided the user has the correct motive.

Let us move on then. You, being the self-proclaimed wiser, must take the lead.

This is rather frustrating. The point of a debate is to defend a point or thesis. You stated a while ago what you were arguing, and now you say you aren't arguing about anything.

If you understand, then let me ask you: what are you trying to prove? What is your thesis?

I don't want to digress into a juvenile squabble, so try to understand. We both believe we are flawed, but our beliefs are based on different premises. You say we're flawed because we can prove it to ourselves. I say it's so because of a higher authority. I make the argument that since we're flawed, we can't trust our thoughts, meaning we can't prove to ourselves that we're flawed. You say that the fact that we can't trust our thoughts because they're flawed is proof we're flawed. This statement commits the Argument from Ignorance fallacy, and is invalid (which we both agree on). You say the solution to your fallacy is to go about proving that we're perfect, and if we can't then we'll know we're flawed. Again, though, I bring in the fact that because we're flawed (which we both agree on), there is no way to get around the fact that we cannot trust our thoughts. Thus, we can make no argument whatsoever that has any integrity, because of the fact that our thoughts are flawed.

I'm afraid you're going in circles here. You stated your paradox, in which Scribo pointed out the clear fallacy, which you apparently knew and agree with. Then you stated the 'solution' to your fallacious paradox, which I revoked. You say you also agree with my revocation. There is no solution to your paradox, as it is fallacious.

You took the words right out of my mouth, Scribo. Yes, that is exactly my point.

Not so. We agree we're flawed. We cannot, however, prove we're flawed. To get around this, we try to prove we're perfect. To be able to prove something, we must have true premises. If we agree we're flawed, though, we cannot conceive of any true premises, thus committing the False Premise fallacy. Our proof then is meaningless.

Sorry I haven't replied for so long. I got extremely busy with exam preparation and execution. If you would like to enlighten us with the solution to your paradox, then please do so. Be warned, however, that you make a rather big logical error in your argument. I've also noticed we've gotten rather far off track, so we could attempt to return to the point we were initially discussing, unless the preference is to continue with this.

slightly_sorryforyourself

In response to Scribo's comment: well put, sir. But I would question, how if we were not flawed? Your assertion was based on the fact that "we are flawed," but we could pose that same question given that we are perfect. What then? For if we were perfect, justice would no longer be a pursuit. Necessarily, then, we would perform all other actions perfectly. In response to GoldRock: you say that the the fact that we don't know we're flawed because we're flawed is proof we're flawed. To one outside our nature, definitely. But that fact that our thoughts, because they are flawed, are not trustworthy, does not mean we know that. Does the fish know it's in water? Does the dog know it's a dog? That is, we cannot logically prove to ourselves that we are either perfect or flawed, as our thoughts do not mirror the truth.

I was making a statement based on your previous assertion, then questioning it. Perhaps I did not pose it in the right way. What I meant to say is, how are we flawed? What are the criteria for knowing? We cannot simply assert that we are so by nature, because then we would be saying we are flawed because we believe we are flawed. If we really are flawed, then our beliefs will be flawed, which means we cannot trust them. If this was so, we must either be perfect, or know we are flawed because of a higher authority.

Some say we wouldn't be human without flaws--that is just stating the obvious, because we know we're flawed, and something cannot exist if it is not itself. But, you would ask, how do we know we're flawed? That is, if we do not know our nature is flawed, we could not say it is inherently so. To be flawed is to lack good. It is an absence of the good. Justice, though, is not an absence of the good. If it were, it would not exist. Let us say justice is an ideal; a good ideal. Now, if it is truly a good ideal, it cannot be corrupted. Necessarily, then, it cannot have been conceived by something corrupt; else it would be corrupt and would not as such exist (it not being itself). So, justice must have either been conceived by something perfect, or it must not exist. For we, in our nature, cannot conceive of perfect things, and perfect things cannot just 'exist'; if they did, we would not know them. How, then, was justice conceived? How, also, do we in our imperfect state, know of justice?

But if justice is an idea we have created ourselves, we cannot say it is flawed without saying that we are flawed. That is, just as it is impossible for a dog to beget a cat, or an elephant a fish, so it is impossible for a certain nature to conceive something different. If that nature is flawed, it will conceive flawed things; if it is perfect, then perfect things. So in saying that justice is flawed, and we ourselves have conceived of justice outside of God, then we must also be flawed. But how did we become so?

Here you divine something important: justice is not the doing of one man, but of many. Is then the doing of justice by many men considered the justice? That is, is justice a cumulative work? And as to what you say that our idea of justice is flawed, does this fact that our idea is flawed make justice flawed? Or perhaps justice is that which is perfect and cannot be flawed, and it is only our incapacity to perform true justice that makes our idea flawed. To put it another way, we as humans do not have the capacity to have righteous anger because we are sinful. God, however, is perfect, and has that capacity (i.e., the temple episode). Therefore, we must say that true anger is a perfect thing; that which is righteous and good, but it is our incapacity to have perfection in an imperfect body that is what prevents us from doing so. So it is with justice.

Very good, sir. Or should I say, well put, you demonic man! (Demonic comes from the greek for divine. The Greeks believed the demon was just a lower class of angel.) Man is indeed unjust by nature, and if justice is the remedying of injustice, then justice is not useless. But we digress. What is justice? To put it another way, what is the essence of justice? Is it an art, as is medicine? For if, in doing justice by remedying injustice, we practice justice, just as a doctor, in doing justice by remedying sickness practices medicine; if in doing that, we practice justice, should we then say that justice is an art? And if so, is there a man of justice, as there is a man of medicine? Or what shall we say on this matter?

"Supply's" is possesive. It is not plural. Learn the english language.

The title should read, "Who's your best friend?"

The title should be, "How many profile views do you currently have?"

Socrates lived around 500 years before Christ and the Greeks were pretty well removed from the influence of the Hebrews, so no, I do not believe Socrates spoke of God (though many critics have speculated that he was the first to "prove" God; not that I think God can, or more importantly, should, be proven, but there it is). I definitely agree with you on the counterpoint that circumstances merit a review, that is, one that we think is our enemy, is possibly not, and one we think our friend, could possibly in reality be our enemy. Also, Socrates points out in 334e that the ones most skilled at certain things, (i.e., the doctor at healing, the lawer at enforcing the law, etc.) are necessarily the ones who are also most skilled at doing harm in that field. Therefore, the one most skilled at doing justice is necessarily also the one most skilled at doing injustice. Furthermore, just as a doctor is useless to a man that is in full health, so justice is useless in the usefulness of things, and useful in things' uselessness. Or is it? To confine justice to these parameters would be to say that it is a useless thing, and morally, we know that justice is a good and wholesome thing (333c). By the way, that's no problem that you haven't read it, but it's a fantastic book, and while it often baffles me, I find it endlessly interesting and thought-provoking. I'm not likening it to the Bible in any sense, but it is a good book.

I'm making this topic for two reasons: to take my mind off my work while still improving my philosophical facilities, and to try to bring more intelligent thought to this forum. We'll start by discussing Socrates' definition of justice which is outlined in Plato's Rebublic. Justice is first brought up when Cephalus remarks that death makes one think on the injustices one has suffered or inflicted. Socrates then says, "But to this very thing justice, shall we so simply assert that it is the truth and giving back what a man has taken from another, or is to do these things sometimes just and sometimes unjust?" (Republic, 331b) At this point, Cephalus' son, Polemarchus, takes over the conversation for his father, and asserts that Simonides the poet's definition of justice right: justice is to give to each what is owed; that is, to do good to one's friends and harm to one's enemies. Here I will open the topic for discussion. What do you think of Socrates' question? Of Polemarchus' response? Is justice really that mechanical? Please use the book and quote frequently to support your arguments. We will try to move this discussion in the direction of that in the book. Let us do this in an ordered and coherent fashion, respecting other people's opinions, which is not to say you can't disagree with them.